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Abs t r ac t . During the 25 years of existence of the first protocol for 
Quantum Key Distribution, much has been said and expected of what 
came to be termed as Quantum Cryptography. After all this time, much 
progress has been done but also the reality check and analysis that nat-
urally comes with maturity is underway. A new panorama is emerging, 
and the way in which the challenges imposed by market requirements are 
tackled will determine the fate of Quantum Cryptography. The present 
paper attempts to frame a reasonable view on the issues of the security 
and market requirements that QKD should achieve to become a mar-
ketable technology. 
1 Introduction 
Setting aside the historical paper of Wiesner about quantum money, the bir th of 
Quantum Cryptography could be associated with the BB84 protocol, actually in 
1983. Although Quan tum Cryptography is a broader field, it was the Quantum 
Key Distribution (QKD) schemes, initiated by this protocol, which shaped the 
field as we know it today. At present, it is only QKD to which a reasonable 
degree of technological matur i ty and market relevance can be ascribed. QKD 
protocols serve the purpose of growing a preshared secret among two parties. 
The preshared secret serves to guarantee the integrity of the protocol in the 
first transaction, while the quantum properties of nature are used to guarantee, 
with any threshold we would like to pose, the privacy of the generated key. In 
the QKD implementation proposals to date, par t of this new generated key is 
used to check the integrity of the next protocol round, a practice tha t should be 
carefully reconsidered from a practical perspective. From a security standpoint, 
integrity control and key generation are two basically different processes, hence 
they should be kept separated [2]. Concepts of separation and controlled infor-
mation flow are a well acknowledged practice [3] tha t has made its way in modern 
high security architectures as exemplified by MILS (Multiple Independent Levels 
of Security/Safety [4]) and tha t could have prevented or, at least, alleviated the 
possible impact of recently discovered weaknesses in QKD [5]. Simple integrity 
control techniques well regarded in practice, like seeding a pseudo random num-
ber generator with an initially shared secret, are robust and demand only a small 
secret to run for a long time. A simple XOR among the strings obtained by this 
method and the quantum key used for the same purpose would provide the best 
of both worlds. 
Key management is the provisions made in a cryptography system design 
that are related to generation, exchange, storage, safeguarding, use, vetting, and 
replacement of keys. It includes cryptographic protocol design, key servers, user 
procedures, and other relevant protocols. Key management is essential for any 
security infrastructure and QKD can be certainly a very powerful primitive to 
strength many operations relevant to the security market. However, while QKD 
protocols can be proven theoretically secure under simple assumptions, these 
are not, and cannot be, backed by implementation under any known industrial 
process. The widely spread view that QKD could achieve perfect secrecy in real 
applications is clearly flawed, certainly from the point of view of the conventional 
cryptography community, as opposed to the quantum cryptography one, where 
many were pushing absolute security as the spear head of the new field. The 
history of cryptography is full of examples of good ideas that have claimed to offer 
higher levels of security, and then reality has put them in the curiosities corner [6]. 
These excessively triumphant views, together with the fact that shared secrets 
are a relatively small part of the whole security market and can be achieved 
by other means [7], led also to the early dismissal of QKD by many security 
practitioners. At most, it was relegated to an immature technology status that 
could be relevant to some niche markets in the future. 
As QKD technology advanced and made its way out of the laboratory and be-
gan to be marketed and tested in competition with more traditional technologies, 
issues about its actual security level, market relevance, reliability, cost/benefit, 
etc. started to arise. 
The first fact to realize in this commercial environment is that in general, 
and in one component in particular, absolute security is not really an interesting 
goal to pursue in itself. Security is a general property of the system that is build 
up over many components and strengthening one of them does not necessary 
makes the full system more secure. Application always dictates the security level 
requirements but usability, reliability, interoperability and cost are many times 
as relevant as security needs. Some are started to be addressed by the QKD 
community using rules akin to those applied to conventional systems. Certifi-
cation is a case in point. To build trust on the final user, similar methods to 
those that have already proven its validity must be used. Intensive and detailed 
independent evaluation, strict quality control, good acceptance by the insurance 
companies and adequate information campaigns help to market a security prod-
uct, but these do not cover all the bases. To base QKD devices certification 
on well known standards like FIPS 140, Common Criteria [8,9], etc. as is being 
done in the current work at the Quantum Industry Specification Group of the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute [10,11] is a reasonable and 
necessary move, maybe the only one possible. These certifications are routinely 
applied to all kinds of electronic devices and their application to the correspond-
ing part in QKD devices should be straightforward. Its use concerning the optical 
subsystem is an unexplored field in need of being addressed. 
QKD modules will include microcontrollers, electronic memories, buses and 
many other elements common to the general microelectronics market. QKD mod-
ules cannot be safer than the software that runs inside them and controls all their 
functionalities. Everything in the software that can be reprogrammed, updated 
or maintained in any way inside a QKD module has to be specially protected be-
cause its integrity must be guaranteed all along the module service. Using general 
purpose hardware and software components (microprocessors, memories, oper-
ating systems, drivers,...) has many advantages, in particular those related to 
the final cost and maintenance, but can also introduce security breaches in the 
system. 
QKD modules require specific purpose software that implements the protocols, 
controls the optoelectronic hardware and is responsible for the administrative 
and operational interfaces. If we accept the software security as an upper security 
bound in a QKD system, as it is with all embedded systems, then the software 
has to be secure by design and has to be evaluated, inspected and certified at a 
high level of security if we want to see the QKD technology in the high security 
market shelves. 
Definitively, security and risk always go together; consequently, security has 
to be as multi-valuated as the risk is in real scenarios. In many infrastructures, 
different security levels are defined, and the products used inside them have to 
match the security level specified. Because of this, different certification levels 
could be adapted to different applications. QKD technology can provide different 
security levels at different costs using different technologies and settings. This 
flexibility must be made available in real QKD systems to exploit its commercial 
horizon because it could match many different scenarios. In principle, Common 
Criteria methodology profiles will help to discover and add some flexibility to 
QKD so as to meet the different demands of those various potential markets. 
However, certification is not the security holy grail, and one must bear in mind 
that, for example, Common Criteria higher levels do not necessarily equate with 
higher security, but claims have been more thoroughly evaluated. For instance, 
Windows XP operating system is EAL4+ certified [12,13], despite the continuous 
patches needed due to the almost daily discovery of security failures. The sets of 
claims for QKD must be carefully crafted to be meaningful for the intended mar-
ket. Certification, however, fulfills an important role for QKD since it translates 
QKD jargon and claims to the language used by its potential customers. 
Usability and interoperability are also requirements that could prove essential 
for the QKD success. QKD must offer a set of characteristics compelling enough 
to be the technique of choice. For an extremely secure application with only a 
point to point link, usability and interoperability could be of secondary interest 
compared to the increase in security; however, for a company seeking to introduce 
QKD in an already deployed platform, these two could prove as essential as the 
perceived security increase. 
QKD devices generate keys to be used outside the QKD device itself and, 
because of that, interoperability with other security systems is absolutely neces-
sary. For example, in a high security environment, the QKD link would generate 
the same key at both ends on the quantum link but, probably, the key will be 
fed into an Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) or fill device 1 that will 
distribute it for its final use. In such case, QKD equipment has to be fully com-
patible with all key management systems it pretends to connect to and operate 
with. 
Interoperability would be also of primary interest in the case of a network 
provider selling QKD services to its clients. For a customer, interoperability is 
a must. It allows for various QKD providers, meaning more market competition 
and thus lower price. It also means not to be locked with just one manufac-
turer. In fact, advanced security models advocate for increasing modularity to 
allow a better security scrutiny but this also means lower maintenance risks and 
costs if you have different providers for each module. QKD systems have to be 
interoperable with all the systems they will work with, and they also require 
full interoperability, standardization and security certification of all its internal 
modules and components (optic fibers, laser, diodes, phase shifters, delay lines, 
etc.). 
Reliability comes hand in hand with low maintenance. One of the advantages 
of QKD is the possibility of low maintenance costs if the system is reliable. 
When using standard devices, a master key is needed to operate the system. 
At a given moment in time, there is no more entropy in the system than that 
originally in the master key. Hence, the need to balance the security level with 
the frequency of master key update. The procedures to change the master key 
in high security systems are rather involved and an acknowledged weakness. In 
a reliable QKD system, this weakness is confined to just the first installation. 
After a correct install, the system can work unattended as long as the device 
does not fail or the channel is interrupted. The system can even raise an alarm in 
case of attack, an example of an advantage of a QKD system over a conventional 
one. Potential low maintenance in QKD systems illustrates also how different the 
new markets for QKD can be from those expected at first sight. In fact, the use 
most commonly cited: as an extremely safe device producing keys to be used in a 
Vernam-Mauborgne cypher, would probably be one of the least used. Cyphering 
large amounts of data through a high speed link with a symmetric block cypher 
like AES would be much more likely. Even for a high speed channel, changing the 
key a few times per hour would suffice to keep a much higher security level than 
the attained nowadays. Hence, a low key generation rate but in a much more 
reliable and interoperable system would be the preferred choice, as opposed to 
the ever higher key generation rate philosophy pursued above all in current 
developments. High key rate would be useful in a scenario in which just one 
QKD link is used to feed keys to many data channels. On the contrary, low key 
rate systems able to withstand high optical losses would be much more suited for 
1
 A fill device is an electronic module used to load cryptographic keys into electronic 
encryption machines. Fill devices are usually hand held and battery operated. 
network integration in s tandard networks, the preferred scenario for a network 
operator. 
Cost comes also with reliability, as it is also a product of physical integration 
in robust and compact devices. When considering the maximum cost of any 
security device, the first thing to mind is tha t investments in a security system 
should never cost more than the assets tha t is trying to protect. Then, the 
reliability and maintenance of the system have to be included. 
When we compare the relative cost of a conventional device to a QKD sys-
tem, several things must be taken into account. In conventional electronic se-
curity devices or systems, main budget expenses go to pay high quality design, 
manufacture, inspection, quality control and secure delivery. QKD systems will 
add to those charges the specific expenses related to its optical and optoelec-
tronic subsystems. This is an additional cost because QKD modules also include 
electronic subsystems tha t are equivalent to those used in actual conventional 
security devices. At this respect, QKD systems have in their optical and quan-
tum subsystems an additional handicap compared with the conventional devices 
in use for key generation and key distribution. 
In general, we can conclude tha t other issues are more or equally important 
than extremely high security levels, and new QKD developments should take 
this into account. 
In order to see a QKD industry pleasantly installed in the telecommunications 
market, many issues are to be addressed. Some of them are already being worked 
out, whereas others will take more time. Once all will be solved, there is certainly 
a range of applications in which QKD will fit nicely. Whether its use will be 
widespread or not, it will depend as much on technological advances with wisely 
chosen development targets as on a correct market approach. 
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